Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Virtue Ethics', 'Letters to Descartes' and 'Existentialism and Humanism'

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47 ideas

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Man IS freedom [Sartre]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
A soul with physical extension is more likely than an immaterial soul that moves bodies [Elizabeth]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse]
Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse]
Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse]
You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
There is no human nature [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse]
Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse]
If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse]
Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse]
We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse]
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse]
Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse]
We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre]
'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre]
It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin]
If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre]