Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truthmaking for Presentists', 'Logicism in the 21st Century' and 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
8784 Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
8787 The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8788 Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
8783 Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8786 One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]