14 ideas
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
| 21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |