57 ideas
18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
15927 | Definition just needs negation, known variables, conjunction, disjunction, substitution and quantification [Weyl, by Lavine] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |