Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truthmaking for Presentists', 'Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I' and 'Prologue to Ordinatio'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
15924 Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17608 We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo]
17607 Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10870 ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg]
13012 Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy]
17609 Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
13017 Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
13015 Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13020 The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy]
13486 Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
13487 In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
18178 For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
13027 Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
9627 Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
9100 Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9101 Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]