Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truthmaking for Presentists', 'Are there propositions?' and 'Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
22406 The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]