Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truthmaking for Presentists', 'Outline of a System of Utilitarianism' and 'Plural Quantification'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
10633 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10638 A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10635 Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
10641 Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
10640 Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
10636 Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
10639 Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10643 We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
10637 Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10634 Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22405 Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
22404 Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]