15 ideas
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
9935 | Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf] |
17927 | Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan] |
9936 | The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |