14 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
| 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 23221 | The brain, and all the mental events within it, consists entirely of sensitive and rational matter [Cavendish] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |