Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truthmaking for Presentists', 'Externalism' and 'Epistemic Justification'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]