Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties', 'Ways of Worldmaking' and 'Why there isn't a ready-made world'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
15395 Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
17644 Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
17648 It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15401 Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron]
15393 An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17643 Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
15396 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
17642 The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]