Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truthmaking for Presentists', 'Folk Psychology' and 'Philosophy as a way of life'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]