13 ideas
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |