75 ideas
| 24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
| 24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
| 24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
| 24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
| 24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
| 24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
| 24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
| 24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
| 24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
| 24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
| 24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
| 24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
| 24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| 24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
| 24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
| 24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
| 24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
| 24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
| 24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
| 24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
| 24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
| 24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
| 24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
| 24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
| 24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
| 24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
| 24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
| 24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
| 22824 | Magna Carta forbids prison without trial, and insists on neutral and correct process [-, by Charvet] |
| 24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
| 24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
| 24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
| 24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |