80 ideas
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |