59 ideas
21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
15382 | Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago] |
21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |