113 ideas
19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |
2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |