105 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |