55 ideas
| 23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
| 23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
| 23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
| 23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
| 23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
| 23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
| 23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
| 23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
| 3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
| 3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
| 3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
| 23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
| 3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
| 3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
| 3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
| 3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
| 3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
| 3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
| 3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
| 3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |