59 ideas
| 18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
| 18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
| 18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
| 17813 | Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP] |
| 17812 | Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
| 18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| 18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
| 18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
| 18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| 18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
| 18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
| 18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
| 18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
| 18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
| 18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
| 18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
| 18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
| 18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
| 18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
| 18298 | Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche] |
| 18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
| 18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |