Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'Sentences' and 'Ordinary Objects'

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56 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logicians acknowledge too few things, while others acknowledge too many [Fitzralph]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]