71 ideas
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |