Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'On the Genealogy of Morals'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche]
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche]
A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche]
A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche]