82 ideas
| 23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
| 5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
| 5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
| 5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
| 5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
| 5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
| 5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
| 5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
| 5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
| 5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
| 5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
| 5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
| 20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
| 20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
| 20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |