83 ideas
| 16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
| 16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
| 16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
| 16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
| 16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
| 16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
| 16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
| 16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
| 16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
| 16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
| 16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
| 16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
| 16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
| 16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
| 16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
| 16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
| 16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
| 16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
| 16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
| 16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
| 16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
| 16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| 16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
| 16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
| 16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
| 16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
| 16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
| 16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
| 16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
| 16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
| 16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
| 16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
| 16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
| 16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
| 16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
| 16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
| 16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 3979 | The Turing Machine is the best idea yet about how the mind works [Fodor on Turing] |
| 5321 | In 50 years computers will successfully imitate humans with a 70% success rate [Turing] |
| 16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |