64 ideas
| 6887 | Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner] |
| 6881 | Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner] |
| 9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
| 5439 | The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner] |
| 9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
| 9959 | 'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner] |
| 9961 | 'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner] |
| 9958 | Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner] |
| 9960 | A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner] |
| 9957 | Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner] |
| 6219 | The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner] |
| 9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
| 9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
| 6888 | Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner] |
| 6877 | Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner] |
| 6880 | Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner] |
| 6879 | 'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner] |
| 6878 | A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner] |
| 6889 | Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner] |
| 9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
| 9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
| 6890 | Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner] |
| 9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
| 9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
| 9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
| 9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
| 6882 | Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner] |
| 6886 | Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner] |
| 6885 | Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner] |
| 6884 | Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner] |
| 6883 | Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner] |
| 5449 | Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner] |
| 6898 | Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner] |
| 9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
| 9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
| 9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
| 6452 | 'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner] |
| 9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
| 9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
| 9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
| 4783 | Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG] |
| 4782 | 'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG] |
| 9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
| 6899 | The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner] |
| 9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
| 6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
| 6896 | Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner] |
| 6897 | Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner] |
| 6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
| 6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
| 6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
| 6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
| 5452 | 'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner] |
| 6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
| 6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
| 6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
| 6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
| 6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
| 9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
| 6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
| 9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |
| 6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
| 6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |