Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logical Syntax of Language', 'Things and Their Parts' and 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
16539 A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
16540 Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
16548 An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
16549 Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13342 Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
13251 Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16545 The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
16546 The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16552 If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16533 Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
16532 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
16534 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16550 Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
16547 H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]