48 ideas
1642 | We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato] |
1645 | The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato] |
1644 | Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato] |
287 | Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato] |
20478 | In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11278 | What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato] |
1643 | If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato] |
10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
7022 | To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
1641 | Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato] |
10784 | Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
16122 | Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato] |
10422 | The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato] |
10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
15855 | If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato] |
10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
1637 | A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
1636 | Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato] |
1638 | Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |