Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essential Attribution', 'A World of States of Affairs' and 'Which Logic is the Right Logic?'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

30 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10775 The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
10766 Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10767 Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10769 Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
10762 In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10776 The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
10774 There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10777 Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp]
10773 The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
10765 Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10763 Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
10770 If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
10771 Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp]
10772 Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
10764 A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp]
10768 Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]