Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers', 'Law and Causality' and 'Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]
Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]