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All the ideas for 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers', 'Reply to Foucher' and 'Events and Their Names'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]