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All the ideas for 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers', 'Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action' and 'Moral Arguments'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794 The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10788 Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
10786 Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799 Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790 Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
10791 Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
10787 Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
10789 Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796 If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797 Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22375 Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22377 Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
22378 We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
22376 Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23674 If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
23675 We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
23672 To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
23673 Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]