Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers', 'Natural Minds' and 'works'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794 The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10788 Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
10786 Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799 Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790 Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
10791 Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
3338 Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
5897 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
10787 Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
10789 Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796 If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797 Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6375 The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
6381 The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
6378 Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6380 Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
6379 A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
6377 Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]