Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers', 'fragments/reports' and 'The Varieties of Necessity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794 The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10788 Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
10786 Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799 Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790 Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
10791 Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
1507 We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5109 The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
1512 Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
1508 Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
10787 Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
10789 Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796 If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797 Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
9216 Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
9214 Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
454 If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9215 Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
455 That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
1511 If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius]