45 ideas
| 7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
| 7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
| 7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
| 7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
| 7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
| 7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
| 7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
| 7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| 7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
| 7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
| 7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
| 7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
| 7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| 7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
| 7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| 16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
| 16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
| 16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
| 16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
| 7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
| 7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| 7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
| 7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
| 7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |