Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Material Constitution', 'The Human Condition' and 'Clarification and Defense of Grounding'

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44 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17292 Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
17295 Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
17297 A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
17302 Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
17303 The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17294 Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
17300 If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17296 We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17301 Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
17293 Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
20146 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17298 Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17299 There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20169 An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20149 To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
19738 Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
20145 Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20170 Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20165 Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
20171 Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
20175 If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
20174 Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20159 Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
20161 The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
20156 We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
20150 There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
20158 Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20151 Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
20152 Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
20153 Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
20162 Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
20157 Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
20154 Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
20172 Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
20173 Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
20155 Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
20164 The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
20163 Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
20148 Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]