Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Material Constitution', 'Analyticity Reconsidered' and 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
19271 No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]
19269 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
7305 Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
19270 If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
11076 Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
11075 The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]