27 ideas
11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |