Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Fragments', 'Identity and Existence in Logic' and 'Explanation and Reference'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]