14 ideas
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |