Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Fear and Trembling', 'Truth and Truthmakers' and 'Reference and Modality'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard]