18 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |