12 ideas
| 16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
| 13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
| 13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
| 13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
| 13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
| 13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |