11 ideas
19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |