137 ideas
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |