193 ideas
2136 | Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato] |
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
23767 | The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
23682 | It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
2151 | Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato] |
2154 | The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato] |
4011 | For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C] |
2093 | You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato] |
2130 | People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
2145 | In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato] |
8726 | Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
9863 | We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato] |
9864 | In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato] |
8727 | Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato] |
9861 | The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
9862 | To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato] |
21818 | Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato] |
2061 | The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
6562 | Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
2142 | The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato] |
5094 | Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle] |
12043 | Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas] |
2159 | Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato] |
17 | A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato] |
12122 | Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato] |
5574 | Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
2133 | Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
2162 | If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
2140 | True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
2096 | Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato] |
6009 | Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak] |
6041 | There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato] |
2127 | The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato] |
1737 | The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
5945 | The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
23316 | For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M] |
16 | We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato] |
16565 | Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato] |
2160 | Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato] |
2163 | Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato] |
2135 | Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato] |
2141 | I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato] |
1869 | The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus] |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
4115 | Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato] |
4547 | Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato] |
2094 | A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato] |
2095 | If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato] |
2129 | Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato] |
2168 | Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato] |
12 | If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato] |
4007 | For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C] |
2137 | The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato] |
2139 | Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato] |
2143 | Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato] |
2147 | The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato] |
2144 | Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato] |
2164 | Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato] |
2138 | Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato] |
2070 | Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato] |
2157 | Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato] |
2134 | Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato] |
2156 | There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato] |
2158 | Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato] |
2123 | Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato] |
2166 | We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato] |
2097 | Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato] |
19946 | Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato] |
5 | Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato] |
7 | Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato] |
8 | Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato] |
15 | Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato] |
5944 | For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
2155 | True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato] |
2126 | A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato] |
23562 | If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato] |
2092 | Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato] |
19889 | People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato] |
19890 | All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato] |
10 | After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato] |
23561 | People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato] |
2149 | Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato] |
2132 | Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato] |
2131 | Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato] |
2152 | Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato] |
2148 | To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato] |
2153 | Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
2630 | If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato] |
14 | If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
2165 | Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato] |
13 | Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato] |
2120 | God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato] |