45 ideas
| 22338 | An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch] |
| 22337 | Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch] |
| 23563 | Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 22341 | Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch] |
| 22347 | Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch] |
| 15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |
| 22348 | Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch] |
| 22339 | Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch] |
| 22343 | If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch] |
| 22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
| 22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
| 22346 | Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch] |
| 22350 | Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch] |
| 22351 | Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch] |
| 22342 | Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch] |
| 22345 | Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch] |