Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Realistic Rationalism' and 'Monadology'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]