11 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
21862 | Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty] |
20750 | The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty] |
15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |