Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Fragments', ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?' and 'A World of States of Affairs'

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10 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]