10 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |